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RECENT DECISIONS
then Congress is the proper forum in which to remedy the
problem.33
M
TAXATION - MEDICAL EXPENSES - LIMITED DEDUCTION FOR
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ALLOWED. -Appellant suffered from a
heart condition that rendered him incapable of climbing the steep
hillside that connected the street and lower level of his residential
property. In order to enjoy the normal use of his property and to
avoid further damage to his heart, the appellant erected a
Hil-A-Vator, designed to carry him up and down the incline.
He unsuccessfully sought to deduct the entire cost of the device
as a medical care expenditure in the district court. In reversing
the judgment of that court in favor of the Commissioner, the
Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit held that the expense involved
in the purchase and installation of the Hil-A-Vator was a medical
care expenditure, and, to the extent that the cost of the device
exceeded the increase in value of the property, it was deductible.
Riach v. Frank, 302 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962).
Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes contain
substantially similar provisions for the deduction from gross income
of certain medical expenses.1 Both Codes likewise contain very
33 Certain sections of the Taft-Hartley Act do expressly repeal sections
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For example, § 301 (e) (61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1958)) repeals § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It
would appear that if Congress had also intended to repeal § 4 this also would
have been done expressly.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x), added by ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 24(a) (1), 53 Stat.
16 (1939), as amended, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat 826 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as 1939 Code]: "Deductions from gross income. In computing net income
there shall be allowed as deductions: .... (x) Medical, dental, etc., expenses.
Expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance
or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent
.. (2) . . . .The term 'medical care,' as used in this subsection, shall
include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance)."
INr. REv. CoDE: OF 1954, § 213 [hereinafter cited as 1954 CoD] :
"Medical, dental, etc., expenses. (a) Allowance of deductions. - There
shall be allowed as a deduction the following amounts of the expenses paid
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise,
for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent. . .
(e) Definitions-For purposes of this section-
(1) The term 'medical care' means amounts paid-
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
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similar provisions prohibiting the deduction from gross income of
amounts paid out for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate of the taxpayer.2
Consequently, a problem existed as to what extent, if any, a
medical care expenditure could be deducted from adjusted gross in-
come when the expense involved a permanent improvement or
betterment which increased the value of the taxpayer's property.
In construing these sections under the 1939 Code, the Tax
Court generally took the position that expenditures which involved
a permanent improvement of the taxpayer's property would not be
allowed as a medical expense deduction.3  In John L. Seymour,4
the Tax Court refused to allow a deduction for the cost and in-
stallation of an oil burner because the unit constituted a permanent
improvement of the taxpayer's property. The deduction was
disallowed despite the fact that the taxpayer was severely allergic
to coal dust and had installed the oil burner on the advice of his
physician. The court made no reference to any increase in value
of the property, but rather stressed the fact that the installation was
permanent. Likewise, in Estate of Hayne,5 the court disallowed
as a medical deduction the cost of an elevator installed in the
home of the crippled taxpayer, on the grounds that it was installed
primarily to solve a transportation problem and resulted in a
permanent improvement of the taxpayer's property. The court
considered it immaterial that there was no increase in the value of
the property, emphasizing that the installation was permanent in
the sense that it had a useful life of more than one year.
While the Tax Court was thus very reluctant to allow de-
ductions for medical expenses involving permanent improvements
or betterments of the taxpayer's property, the district courts took
a position more favorable to the taxpayer.0  In Hollander v.
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred
to in subparagraph (A)."
2 1939 Code § 24: "(a) General Rule. In computing net income no
deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of-(2) Any amount
paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate ... .
1954 CODE § 263: "(a) General Rule.-No deductions shall be allowed
for-(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent im-
provements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate."
3 Estate of Hayne, 22 T.C. 113 (1954); John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111
(1950).4 Supra note 3.
5 Supra note 3.6 Hollander v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1955) ; Alexander v.
United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'T9335 (W.D. Tenn. 1956).
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Commissioner,7 a victim of heart disease installed a collapsible
inclinator in his home. The Court of Appeals, reversing the
Tax Court, allowed a deduction of the purchase price and in-
stallation costs. The court distinguished Seymour 8 on the ground
that the elevator there involved was a permanent improvement
thereby implying that the inclinator was not a permanent fixture.
The Hollander opinion was cited by the district court, in Alexander
v. United States,9 as authority for allowing as a medical expense
deduction, a $2700 elevator installed in the residence of a heart
victim. No mention was made of any increase in value of the
taxpayer's property, nor did the court concern itself with the
decision reached in Seymour, to the effect that no deductions would
be allowed for permanent improvements.
The Tax Court, however, remained reluctant to allow the
deduction of medical expenses involving permanent improvements
of the taxpayer's property. For example, in Frank S. Delp,'0
the Tax Court disallowed the deduction of a $1750 central air-
conditioner on the ground that no deduction could be allowed for
an expenditure representing a permanent improvement to property.
The court distinguished Hollander on the theory that the inclinator
there was not a permanent improvement. However, in Berry v.
W isemnan," the district court allowed a medical expense de-
duction for the cost of an elevator installed on the taxpayer's
property. The elevator, although permanent, did not increase the
value of the property. In reaching its decision, the court cited
both Alexander and Hollander as authority for allowing the de-
duction of a medical expenditure involving a permanent improve-
ment of the property. In citing Hollander as authority for allow-
ing the deduction, the court ignored the fact that the inclinator
involved in that case apparently was not a permanent improvement.
The Commissioner. in accepting the decision reached in the Berry
case, qualified it to the extent that a permanent improvement that
increased the value of the property would not be allowed as a
medical expense deduction.'2
In view of its traditional restraint in allowing deductions in
this area, it is interesting to note that the Tax Court, in Rallmon
Gerard,'3 was the first to extend the Berry decision so as to allow
the deduction, as a medical expense, of a permanent improvement
which increased the value of the taxpayer's property. Thus, the
court declined to follow the Commissioner's qualification of the
7 Supra note 6.
s John L. Seymour, supra note 3.
9 Supra note 6.
10 30 T.C. 1230 (1958).
11174 F. Supp. 748 (D.C. Okla. 1958).
12 Rev. Rul. 411, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 100.
13 37 T.C. 826 (1962).
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Berry decision. The Gerard case involved a central air-conditioner
costing $1300 which was purchased to alleviate cystic fibrosis. The
resulting increase in value of the property was $800. The court
held that the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction of $500
because the original expense had been compensated for only to the
extent that the property had increased in value. Therefore, the
taxpayer was entitled to a deduction for the difference.
Upon consideration of the relation between medical expenses
and permanent improvements which increase the value of the
taxpayer's property, the Court in the principal case rejected the
Government's contention that if the installation increases the value
of the property to any extent, the expenditure is not deductible in
any amount.
If it is supposed that an admittedly proper medical care expenditure was
made upon the taxpayer's property at a cost of $1000 and the finding of the
court is that the value of the whole property was increased by $1.
it would not seem reasonable that the entire cost be disallowed a deduction.14
The Court indicated that the same conclusion would be reached
even without a consideration of section 263 which disallows a
deduction for amounts paid out for permanent improvements. The
medical expense section itself limits deductions to those "not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 15 Since an increase
in the value of his property would, to that extent, compensate the
taxpayer for the expenditure, the only amount deductible would
be the difference between the cost of the improvement and the
increase in value of the property.
In reaching the decision in the instant case, the Court also
rejected the Government's contention that the facts here could be
distinguished from earlier cases which involved elevators. Although
those cases had frequently involved elevators which had been in-
stalled to provide for an "essential living function," the Court main-
tained that there is nothing in the statute, regulations, or cases
which limits deductions to those improvements necessary for eating,
sleeping and using the bathroom. Observing that "there is more
to life than that," the Court concluded that, in installing the
Hil-A-Vator, the taxpayer was motivated primarily by the
mitigation or prevention of disease in the reasonable use of his
property.1 6
After Berry v. Wiseman,17 the prime consideration in allowing
medical expense deductions for permanent improvements has been
14 Riach v. Frank, 302 F.2d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1962).
15 1954 CODE § 213(c).
16 The Court, aware of the obvious similarity between the principal case
and the Hayne case (see text accompanying note 5 supra), distinguished
the latter as involving primarily a transportation expense.
17 Supra note 11.
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the increase in the value of the taxpayer's property. In the prin-
cipal case, the Court of Appeals has, for the first time, allowed the
deduction of an expenditure representing the cost of a permanent
capital improvement which increased the value of the taxpayer's
property. However, the amount of the deduction is limited to the
extent that the cost of the improvement, exceeds the increase in
value of the property.
Although the decision reached in the principal case is definitely
favorable to the taxpayer, it must be borne in mind that there
is a statutory limitation on the amount allowed as a deduction
for medical expenses in a given year.18
Should the difference between the cost of the improvement
and the increase in value of the property exceed this maximum,
the taxpayer would be deprived of so much of the allowed de-
duction as exceeded the yearly maximum, unless permitted- to
amortize the difference over the period representing the useful life
of the improvement. However, to what extent, if any, the deduction
can be amortized, remains unanswered by this case. Since the
Treasury Regulations have been amended to conform with the
decision reached in the principal case, it is quite probable that
any future litigation in the area will involve this question of
amortization.' 9
18 1954 CODE § 213(c).
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (1957), as amended, T.D. 6604, 1962 INT. REV.
BuLL. No. 34, at 12.
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